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What is a mandatory expert determination clause? And will the courts stay a claim and require parties to comply with such a clause as an alternative to litigation/arbitration?
In Dandara South East Ltd v Medway Preservation Ltd & Anor [2024], the High Court considered the enforceability and scope of expert determination clauses in construction contracts. In particular, the court considered whether an expert determination clause is separable from the underlying agreement, such that it survives the termination of that agreement. This is a novel point that does not appear to have received judicial consideration before this case.
We examine the decision in Dandara in more detail below.
The dispute resolution clause in the contract mandated that "any dispute or difference between the parties as to any matter under or in connection with this contract shall be submitted for the determination of an Expert".
It further provided that the expert's determination was to be "conclusive and binding on the parties save in the case of manifest error or omission."
The contract also contained a further clause providing that the "courts of England and Wales shall have exclusive jurisdiction to settle any dispute or claim arising out of or in connection with this contract or its subject matter or formation (including non-contractual disputes or claims)".
Master Brightwell observed that expert determination clauses are often carved out of the "primary jurisdiction given to the court" (as in Secretary of State for Transport v Stagecoach South Western Trains Ltd [2009]). In such cases, expert determination clauses generally anticipate some disputes being resolved by an expert, and some disputes by the court (or arbitration if applicable).
However, this was not the case here: the language of the clause was broad and inclusive, covering "any dispute or difference between the parties as to any matter under or in connection with this contract". This mirrored the "breadth of disputes generally subject to an arbitration clause". As such, it was held to be an all-embracing (or "one-stop shop") provision which was intended to cover all disputes arising from the contract, including those related to its termination.
This did not, however, "denude clause 31 [exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales] of all effect". Instead, the court confirmed that the procedure would be as follows:
Drawing parallels with arbitration clauses, Master Brightwell found that the authorities support the view that there is a "strong connection between the one-stop principle and separability".
He noted that there was no authority directly on point but that it "must be a matter of contractual construction" with the question being dependent on the parties' objective intentions. It had been established that the parties intended for all disputes relating to the contract to be subject to expert determination. Therefore, the burden was on the claimant (i.e. the party arguing against separability) to explain why the parties would objectively have intended some disputes nonetheless to be resolved by the courts. The claimant had not done so.
The court therefore held that Clause 28 was separable and thus enforceable independent of the main contract, for the purposes of determining a dispute as to whether the contract had been terminated.
The claimant had also asserted that the dispute was too complex for expert determination, involving intricate factual and legal issues that required judicial intervention.
The court rejected this argument. It highlighted that parties to construction contracts often agree that disputes of fact will be resolved by an expert in a short period of time, without disclosure of the kind that would be ordered in court proceedings. The court found no fundamental flaws in the procedural scheme of Clause 28 that would render it unsuitable for resolving the present dispute.
In light of the above, the court granted the defendants’ application for a stay of proceedings, to enable the parties' compliance with the expert determination clause.
This case serves as a critical reminder for legal practitioners to draft and review dispute resolution clauses in construction contracts with care. The decision in Dandara turned on the construction of the clause in question as a "one-stop shop" for resolution of all disputes under the contract. The judgment confirms that, where this is the case, the principle of separability will apply such that the clause will survive termination of the contract.
If the parties intend for certain issues to be referred to expert determination (or another form of alternative dispute resolution) with others to be resolved in litigation / arbitration, then those specific issues must be expressly carved out for expert determination. Whether or not such clauses would be regarded as separable from the underlying agreement was not addressed in the judgment and remains to be seen.
If you have any questions about this article, please get in touch with Daniel Wood or Emma Knight.
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