Taylor Rodrigues
Associate
Article
15
Like many of us, Canadian public authorities and courts are increasingly using artificial intelligence (“AI”) tools in their day-to-day work. While AI tools may provide welcome administrative efficiencies, their use by decision-makers raises important concerns. The most pressing are (i) ensuring that the decision-makers—and not the AI tools—are grappling with the substance of, and ultimately deciding, the matters before them; and (ii) ensuring that the resulting decisions are procedurally fair to those they affect.
Many Canadian decision-makers are, laudably, working through these concerns in public. This article summarizes the current, public guidelines issued by Canadian courts and governments on the use of AI in administrative and judicial decision-making. It then identifies a number of lessons from the evolving case law on the use of AI and raises some important open questions.
Ultimately, whether AI has affected an individual’s or business’s rights to procedural fairness or produced an unreasonable decision depends on the circumstances. If you are concerned that an administrative decision was unfair or unreasonable, feel free to contact any member of our Administrative and Public Law Group for assistance.
Currently, there are not many public rules or guidelines specifically governing the use of AI by administrative decision-makers, tribunals, or courts. We summarize them in this section.
On October 24, 2024, the Canadian Judicial Council (“CJC”), a national body that oversees federally appointed judges in Canada, released its Guidelines for the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Canadian Courts (the “CJC Guidelines”).[1]
The CJC Guidelines expressly deal with the first concern identified above. They emphasize that “no judge is permitted to delegate decision-making authority, whether to a law clerk, administrative assistant, or computer program, regardless of their capabilities.” However, the CJC Guidelines go on to state that judges are permitted to delegate non-judicial decision-making tasks such as proofreading and dictation.[2]
The CJC Guidelines provide seven guiding principles:
The CJC Guidelines “aim to provide Canadian judges with a principled framework for understanding the extent to which AI tools can be used appropriately to support or enhance the judicial role.”[5] According to the CJC, the CJC Guidelines are “aspirational and advisory in nature.”[6] However, a court could adopt a portion of the CJC Guidelines into the common law.
On September 29, 2025, the Federal Court published its Interim Principles and Guidelines on the Court’s Use of Artificial Intelligence (the “Federal AI Guidelines”).[7]
The Federal AI Guidelines require that the Federal Court:
To our knowledge, the Federal Court has not conducted public consultations on the use of AI in making its judgments or orders. If correct, the Federal AI Guidelines currently preclude the Court from using AI “in its decision-making function” (presumably, when deciding the substance of judgments or orders).
On June 24, 2025, the Government of Canada updated its Directive on Automated Decision-Making (the “Federal Directive”) which applies to nearly all federal departments, boards and tribunals.[8] The Federal Directive applies to all automated decision systems developed or procured after April 1, 2020, used to make an administrative decision or a related assessment about a client.
The Federal Directive is intended to ensure “that automated decision systems are used in a manner that reduces risks to clients, departments and Canadian society, and leads to more efficient, accurate, consistent and interpretable decisions made pursuant to Canadian law.”[9]
The Federal Directive requires that applicable federal decision-makers:
All administrative decisions must be reasonable; that is, they must comply with the legal and factual constraints bearing on them.[10] While government policies are not legally binding, they can assist a court in determining whether an interpretation or a decision is reasonable.[11] As such, a department’s failure to comply with the Federal Directive could bear on the reasonableness of its decision.
Under section 5(1)(c) of the federal Access to Information Act, the Government of Canada must annually publish “a description of all manuals used by employees of each government institution in administering or carrying out any of the programs or activities of the government institution.” This includes manuals for any AI tools or systems.
On January 7, 2026, the Government of Ontario updated its Responsible Use of Artificial Intelligence Directive (the “Ontario Directive”) which sets out the requirements for the transparent, responsible and accountable use of AI by the Government of Ontario.[12]
The Ontario Directive sets out six principles:[13]
Under the Ontario Directive, if the public is interacting directly with a service that leverages AI (e.g., a chatbot) or if AI is involved in decision-making directly affecting a member of the public (e.g., determining eligibility for a government service or benefit), then the Government of Ontario must:[14]
The Ontario Directive states the second requirement does not create a new avenue of seeking review of decisions and reaffirms that pre-existing legal avenues to challenge a decision or outcome of a process, service or program continue to apply. Individuals can continue to challenge Ontario decisions through statutory rights of appeal or applications for judicial review.
Section 27 of Ontario’s Statutory Powers Procedure Act requires that the Ontario tribunals to which it applies publish their rules and guidelines, including rules and guidelines governing AI.[15]
In April 2025, Tribunals Ontario, a group of 12 Ontario tribunals, published their Practice Direction on the Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Tribunal Proceedings (the “Tribunals AI Direction”).[16] Consistent with concern (i) identified above, the Tribunals AI Direction forbids its Tribunal members from using AI to write their decisions or analyze evidence.
The Tribunals AI Direction allows parties to use AI in proceedings before its Tribunal members; however, it reminds parties that they remain responsible for the accuracy of their written and oral submissions even if they used AI to help prepare them.
Administrative decision-makers owe individuals in administrative proceedings a duty of procedural fairness.[17] The level of procedural protections an individual is entitled to depends on all the circumstances, including:[18]
AI merely assisting in making a decision does not make the decision procedurally unfair.[19]
However, early cases suggest that where AI assistance is used, the method(s) by which it was employed should be disclosed to the affected party.
For instance, in Barre v. Canada,[20] the applicants alleged that the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration relied on racially biased AI photo comparison software to reject their refugee applications. The Federal Court held that the Refugee Protection Division erred in allowing the Minister to admit photo comparisons without disclosing the methodology that was used.[21]
Similarly, in Ali v. Canada, the Federal Court held that the Refugee Protection Division violated the applicant’s right to procedural fairness when it:[22]
Generally, the law only requires administrative decision-makers to make reasonable decisions, not ideal or perfect decisions.[23] To be reasonable, an administrative decision must be:
The Federal Court has held that AI merely assisting in making a decision does not, without more, make the decision unreasonable.[24]
In a series of cases, the Federal Court has examined the use of Chinook, an AI-assisted tool, used in visa processing.[25] The Federal Court has consistently held that an immigration officer’s use of Chinook to process visa applications does not, on its own, raise issues of reasonableness or procedural fairness.[26]
Administrative decision-makers enjoy a presumption that their decisions are lawful and reasonable. The burden is on applicants challenging a decision to prove otherwise.[27] Therefore, applicants likely need to have clear evidence to prove that a decision-maker’s use of AI was unreasonable or procedurally unfair to set aside a decision on that ground.
In Haghshenas v. Canada, the Federal Court rejected the applicant’s bald allegations that Chinook was not reliable or efficacious.[28] However, in a subsequent case, Ali v. Canada, the Federal Court held that it was procedurally unfair to simply accept counsel’s statements that its client manually compared photographs instead of using facial recognition technology.[29]
The Federal Court jurisprudence on Chinook emphasizes that the challenged decisions were reasonable and procedurally fair because a visa officer, and not Chinook, made the final decision.[30]
Certain AI tools that do not provide a basis for their outputs or otherwise explain their reasoning—so-called “opaque” or “black box” systems—raise specific concerns. If a decision maker relies on the outputs of such a tool, without knowing how those outputs were generated, it is not at all clear how its resulting decision can be transparent, justified, and intelligible.
In Sopeyin v. Canada, the Federal Court held that an immigration officer refusing a work permit based on evidence of “unknown provenance” prevented the Court from assessing the decision and undermined the “the transparency, justification and intelligibility of the Decision and therefore its reasonableness.”[31] The Federal Court reaffirmed that procedural fairness required the Immigration Officer to give the applicants an opportunity to respond to evidence before relying on it to reject their applications. On the strength of Sopeyin, it is at least arguable that the outputs of any “black box” AI tools, being of “unknown provenance” could also undermine the reasonableness of any resulting decision.
Generally, tribunals and courts require applicants to disclose the use of AI tools in their submissions or verify the output of AI tools instead of outright banning the use of AI tools.[32] The case law has identified some restrictions on parties’ ability to use AI, even where it is disclosed.
AI prompts and outputs have been held not to be “evidence.” In Kevin Huggins v. Red Lobster,[33] the applicant attempted to enter the questions and answers he received from an AI tool into evidence. The Ontario Labour Relations Board (“Board”) held that these documents were submissions, not evidence.[34] The Board also held that attempting to introduce these documents was an abuse of process because it was in violation of the Board’s previous directions.
In at least one case, following the filing of written submissions that included fictitious or irrelevant citations, a Court ordered counsel to personally prepare new submissions without using any generative AI for legal research.[35]
In Internet Sciences Inc v. CNSX Markets Inc,[36] the applicant accused a Capital Markets Tribunal adjudicator of being partial for (i) suggesting that the applicant’s references to non-existent or misstated Rules were caused by misusing generative AI and (ii) reminding all the parties that they should ensure the accuracy of their materials regardless of whether they used generative AI.[37]
The Capital Markets Tribunal adjudicator held that her comments did not indicate that she would not decide the matter fairly. She declined to recuse herself.
Below, we identify a few questions that the evolving case law has not yet clearly answered.
In Haghshenas v. Canada, the Federal Court rejected the applicant’s argument that an administrative decision cannot be reasonable “until it is elaborated to all stakeholders how machine learning has replaced human input and how it affects application outcomes.”[38]
Subsequently, the Government of Canada introduced the Directive on Automated Decision-Making which requires federal decision-makers to meaningfully explain to the public how automated decision-making tools work. However, it is unclear whether the public has any legal recourse if a federal decision-maker does not follow the Federal Directive. The Government of Canada could internally discipline federal decision-makers who are non-compliant with the Federal Directive.
The amount of information administrative decision-makers must disclose depends on the importance of the decision. For example, individuals are entitled to more information when facing criminal charges than regulatory charges.
In R. v. Siddiqui, the Court found that facial recognition software and its results are relevant and must be produced to the accused in a robbery and assault trial.[39]
In the R. v Hughes companion cases, the Court found that an automated software used to collect evidence against the accused was relevant, but the public’s interest in protecting police investigatory techniques outweighed the accused’s legitimate interest in disclosure of operational copies of the software.[40] The Court also found that the accused was not entitled to the source code for the software, or the training materials for the software because they were not relevant to the criminal charges.[41] The Court ordered the Crown to produce the software’s manuals, logs, transcripts, and validation test reports after permitting the Crown to make redactions for lack of relevance and privilege.[42]
In May v. Ferndale Institution,[43] the Supreme Court of Canada held that procedural fairness required that Correctional Service of Canada disclose a computerized scoring matrix to inmates before relying on it to make decisions on transferring inmates.
In Re Lamarche,[44] the accused, who was facing regulatory securities charges, brought a preliminary application requesting the disclosure of technical information relating to the software the Director used to collect evidence against him (among other relief sought). The British Columbia Securities Commission held that the architecture of the e-discovery software and the software provider’s security protocols was not relevant and need not be disclosed to the accused.[45]
It would be unreasonable for a decision-maker to accept, wholesale, the outcome of an AI tool, or to adopt the reasons of an AI tool without understanding how the AI reached that outcome. Administrative decision-makers are prohibited from fettering their discretion, and cannot abdicate their responsibility to decide matters delegated to them by Parliament or the legislature. However, the Federal Court suggests in Pjetracaj v. Canada, that an applicant needs “clear evidence” to prove that an administrative decision-maker inappropriately delegated its decision-making power to an AI tool.[46]
Provided an administrative decision-maker actually makes the decision, the common law likely does not prohibit them from using AI to help draft their reasons. In Boukhanfra v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), the Federal Court held that decision-makers may make use of boiler-plate statements or reasons, but cautioned that boiler-plate language alone does not render a decision immune from judicial review.[47]
In Haghshenas v. Canada, the Federal Court held that the fact that a visa decision was reached with the assistance of AI was not relevant to the duty of procedural fairness.[48]
However, it is far from clear that the use of AI is never relevant to the duty of procedural fairness. For example, if an applicant has a legitimate expectation that an administrative decision-maker will follow a particular process (e.g., a human will make a decision without relying on AI), procedural fairness requires that process be followed. Importantly, such expectations extend only to procedure, not to substantive outcomes.
[1] Canadian Judicial Council, Canadian Judicial Council issues Guidelines for the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Canadian Courts (October 24, 2024).
[2] Martin Felsky and Karen Eltis, Guidelines for the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Canadian Courts, Canadian Judicial Council (September 2024) at 3.
[3] Canadian Judicial Council, Policy Framework to Accommodate the Digital Environment (Discussion paper, 2013).
[4] Canadian Judicial Council, Ethical Principles for Judges (2021).
[5] Martin Felsky and Karen Eltis, Guidelines for the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Canadian Courts, Canadian Judicial Council (September 2024) at 3.
[6] Canadian Judicial Council, Canadian Judicial Council issues Guidelines for the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Canadian Courts (October 24, 2024).
[7] Federal Court, Interim Principles and Guidelines on the Court’s Use of Artificial Intelligence (September 29, 2025).
[8] Treasury Board, Directive on Automated Decision-Making (May 24, 2025).
[9] Treasury Board, Directive on Automated Decision-Making (May 24, 2025), s 4.1.
[10] Pepa v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 SCC 21 at paras 49-51.
[11] Terrapure BR Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FC 1715 at para 138.
[12] Government of Ontario, Responsible Use of Artificial Intelligence Directive (January 7, 2026).
[13] Government of Ontario, Responsible Use of Artificial Intelligence Directive (January 7, 2026), s 5.
[14] Government of Ontario, Responsible Use of Artificial Intelligence Directive (January 7, 2026), s 6.3.
[15] Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22, s 27.
[16] Tribunals Ontario, Practice Direction on the Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Tribunal Proceedings (April 2025).
[17] Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Police Commissioners, 1978 CanLII 24 (SCC) at 324; Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC) at para 20.
[18] Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC) at paras 23-27.
[19] Haghshenas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 464 at para 22.
[20] Barre v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1078.
[21] Barre v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1078 at para 31.
[22] Ali v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2024 FC 1085 at para 28.
[23] Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at para 16.
[24] Haghshenas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 464 at para 24.
[25] See Pjetracaj v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 103 at para 37.
[26] Espinosa Cotacachi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 2081 at paras 22; Jamali v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1328 at para 43.
[27] Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at para 291.
[28] Haghshenas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 464 at para 28.
[29] Ali v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2024 FC 1085 at para 28.
[30] See e.g., Luk v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 623 at para 15; Haghshenas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 464 at para 28.
[31] Sopeyin v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1435 at para 25.
[32] See e.g., Federal Court, Notice to the Parties and the Profession: The Use of Artificial Intelligence in Court Proceedings (May 7, 2024); see e.g., Hussein v. Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2025 FC 1060 at para 39.
[33] Kevin Huggins v Red Lobster, 2025 CanLII 130870 (ON LRB).
[34] Kevin Huggins v Red Lobster, 2025 CanLII 130870 (ON LRB) at paras 98-101.
[35] R. v. Chand, 2025 ONCJ 282 at para 5.
[36] Internet Sciences Inc v CNSX Markets Inc, 2026 ONCMT 9.
[37] Internet Sciences Inc v CNSX Markets Inc, 2026 ONCMT 9 at paras 81 and 90-91.
[38] Haghshenas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 464 at para 28.
[39] R. v. Siddiqui, 2022 ONCJ 62 at paras 12, 14 and 24.
[40] R. v Hughes, 2022 ONSC 5209 at para 236; R. v Hughes, 2022 ONSC 2164.
[41] R. v Hughes, 2022 ONSC 2164 at paras 128 and 143.
[42] R. v Hughes, 2022 ONSC 5209 at paras 240-248.
[43] May v. Ferndale Institution, 2005 SCC 82 at paras 88, 92, and 117-119.
[44] Re Lamarche, 2026 BCSECCOM 66.
[45] Re Lamarche, 2026 BCSECCOM 66 at para 70.
[46] Pjetracaj v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 103 at paras 34-37.
[47] Boukhanfra v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 4 at para 9.
[48] Haghshenas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 464 at paras 22 and 28.
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