Manpreet Kandola
Principal Associate
Article
In Premier Modular Ltd v Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust [2026], the Technology and Construction Court (TCC) refused to enforce an adjudication decision worth £1.65 million, holding that the responding party had a real prospect of establishing that the decision was reached in breach of the rules of natural justice.
The judgment is a useful reminder that, while enforcement is refused only in rare cases, an adjudicator who decides the central issue on a basis that neither party advanced — and without inviting comment — risks having the decision struck down.
Prior to reaching his decision, the adjudicator put some questions to the parties for clarification. In particular, he:
Both parties responded that the Accepted Programme was never updated and contained no obligation to provide the mains water supply by any particular date.
Despite this, the adjudicator decided the case on an entirely different footing. He awarded PML the sum of £1.65 million on the basis that:
The adjudicator considered the clause 60.1(3) analysis to be "that simple", even though it had not occurred to either party.
The Trust resisted enforcement on the grounds that the adjudication decision was contrary to natural justice. PML subsequently sought to summarily enforce the judgment.
In particular, the Trust advanced three grounds for resisting enforcement:
Ground 1: The Adjudicator's central finding that there was a compensation event pursuant to 60.1(3) had been made in the absence of any submission by either party.
Ground 2: The Adjudicator failed to address one of the Trust's defences to the original claim, namely that PML had failed to notify the Trust of a compensation event according to the condition precedent.
Ground 3: The Adjudicator made a finding that the Accepted Programme had been updated – this was not part of the adjudication and was contrary to the clear position of both parties in the Adjudication.
The TCC applied well-established principles which confirm that a breach of natural justice will occur where an adjudicator "goes off on a frolic of his own" by deciding on a factual or legal basis not argued by either side, without giving the parties an opportunity to comment.
On Grounds 1 and 3, the Court concluded that this was a rare case of obvious unfairness. In particular, the adjudicator had decided the central issue — whether the water main was supplied on time so as to give rise to a compensation event — on a basis that:
That, the judge held, looked "very much like an adjudicator going off on a frolic of his own".
Whilst an adjudicator is not obliged to accept the submissions of one party over another, departing from the submissions of both requires adequate canvassing of the issues, which did not happen here.
Ground 2, however, was dismissed: the adjudicator had addressed condition-precedent/time-bar defence. Even if he had misunderstood the Trust's case or the contractual regime, that was not a breach of natural justice; it is not for the enforcement court to pick over which parts of a decision are correct.
Significantly, he distinguished cases of oversight under time pressure from the present case, in which the adjudicator "did not neglect a matter under pressure of time" but rather "sought to create a case" for PML which PML had not made, and which the Trust had no real opportunity to challenge.
The key lesson is procedural: where a decisive point occurs to the adjudicator that neither party has advanced — even one thought to be "that simple" — fairness requires that it be put to the parties before it is adopted.
For responding parties, the case illustrates the continuing importance of distinguishing genuine natural justice complaints from mere disagreement with the merits: the ground that succeeded turned on the adjudicator deciding on an unargued basis, whereas the alleged failure to deal with a defence, and the jurisdictional argument, both failed.
If you have any queries on this article, please get in touch with Manpreet Kandola.
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