Rasan Sahota
Associate
Article
10
Across Ontario, the province’s local distribution companies (LDCs), many of which are wholly or partially municipally owned, are facing a confluence of crises: increasing capital demands, unrelenting regulatory pressure, and a rapidly evolving smart grid that is more complex than ever before.
This moment of crisis is forcing municipalities to re-evaluate the core bargain of owning utility assets. The status quo is unsustainable, and therefore, demands immediate strategic action from municipal shareholders to address financial viability, governance challenges, and the palpable inevitability of sector consolidation. The recent formation of the Panel for Utility Leadership and Service Excellence (PULSE) signifies the provincial government's recognition that the future of Ontario’s distribution system is now being defined by shifts in technology, finance, and policy.
The origin of municipally owned electricity utilities traces back to the early 1900s, born from the conviction of local leaders that accessible, affordable electricity was essential for the prosperity of their towns and cities. This model persisted until the late 1990s, when the province restructured the sector. The Electricity Act, 1998 mandated the transformation of more than 300 former Municipal Electricity Utilities (MEUs)—often internal municipal departments—into regulated business corporations (LDCs) governed by the Ontario Business Corporations Act (OBCA).
The result was a unique entity: a regulated, for-profit corporation whose shareholder remained the municipality. This established a critical and, until recently, highly beneficial bargain:
While LDCs remain fundamentally stable, their viability as a steady dividend source is severely stressed. The current era of massive capital need means that cash previously earmarked for dividends must be retained for system renewal, modernization, and growth. Without access to sufficient new capital, LDCs will increasingly face a choice: cut dividends to self-fund investment or sell/convert equity (shares) to fund operating requirements, any of which only defers the underlying operational or capital deficit. For many, the golden age of LDC dividends is fading, hence placing their future viability in jeopardy unless major investment is secured.
The capital challenge facing Ontario’s LDCs stems from the simultaneous onset of three major technological and economic pressures: renewal, growth, and modernization.
Ontario’s LDCs must replace vast amounts of aging physical assets, many of which date back to the mid-20th century. Analysts estimated that these maintenance requirements alone would total approximately $16.6 billion over 20 years (as of the 2011 assessment). This replacement cycle places significant strain on rates and financing capacity. (Notably, the long, often subjective, lifespan of these assets can create flexibility for deferral or early replacement, which provides ample 'wiggle room' that can be exploited by savvy management teams.)
For the first time in decades, Ontario is facing significant, sustained growth in electricity demand. The Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) projects that electricity demand could more than double by 2050. This rapid increase is driven by:
The grid must transition from a passive, one-way system to an active, two-way architecture that manages distributed generation resources (DERs). This evolution requires significant investment in Smart Grid technology, sensors, automation, and a potential shift toward a Distribution System Operator (DSO) model. Many smaller LDCs lack the financial capacity and technical expertise to manage this transition, therefore risking a future where new technological benefits are unevenly distributed across the province.
The impact of this capital crunch is felt directly by the community and the ratepayer through:
The consensus on the need for LDC reform is not new; it has been articulated in major government-mandated reviews spanning over a decade.
The Ontario Distribution Sector Review Panel (2012), led by Murray Elston and including our then partner, David McFadden, concluded that the fragmented sector—over 80 LDCs, many very small—was inherently inefficient and structurally unable to meet future demands.
Key findings and recommendations included:
While not directly focused on consolidation, the Collingwood Judicial Inquiry (2020) provided profound lessons on the governance risks inherent in municipal LDC ownership and is a must-read for senior municipal leaders tasked with guiding municipal Councils on LDC-related choices. A portion of this Inquiry examined the sale of a 50% interest in the Town of Collingwood’s electric utility, Collus Power Corporation. PowerStream Incorporated, the successful bidder, had received various unfair advantages throughout the procurement process.
The Inquiry, led by Justice Frank Marrocco, released 306 recommendations and highlighted systemic failures in transparency and oversight:
The formation of the PULSE Panel (Panel for Utility Leadership and Service Excellence) in 2025 demonstrates that the core issues identified in 2012 and magnified by crises like the Collingwood Judicial Inquiry and accelerating load growth are still critical. PULSE is tasked with providing strategic recommendations to the Minister of Energy, specifically focusing on enhancing operational performance, addressing financing gaps for municipally owned utilities, evaluating governance and investment models, and improving service excellence. Its formation is a clear signal of impending policy action.
PULSE is expected to deliver its final recommendations to the Minister of Energy and Mines in early 2026. A public consultation period for stakeholders is open until December 15, 2025, to provide feedback on proposed changes to the electricity distribution sector via Review of Ontario's Electricity Distribution Sector.
Despite the 2012 Ontario Distribution Sector Review Panel recommendations, the fragmentation of the sector remains the most significant structural barrier to efficiency. Small- and mid-sized utilities struggle to achieve the scale necessary to attract low-cost capital, invest in sophisticated smart grid technology, and afford the in-house expertise required to manage the modern, complex distribution system.
Consolidation, particularly that involving private or public-private investment, has been severely hampered by federal tax policy, commonly referred to as the tax barrier or PILs trap.
LDCs that are at least 90% publicly owned pay Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILs) to the province (Ontario), which mimics corporate income tax but exempts them from the Federal Income Tax Act (ITA).
The problem arises when an LDC seeks external, non-municipal equity (e.g., from a private investor or a pension fund like OMERS) and opens itself to:
The Ontario government has offered the following incentives to encourage LDC consolidation.:
These taxation changes, however, do not eliminate the main financial barrier and most significant component of the financial penalty: the depreciation recapture liability.
The "departure tax" still requires the LDC to include the recapture of previously claimed depreciation (capital cost allowance) on its depreciable assets in its income. This substantial liability, estimated at 26.5% of the depreciation recapture and paid to Ontario, is often the largest tax cost of the transaction, effectively neutralizing the capital gains exemption. This enduring liability continues to chill private-sector appetite and must be addressed by the Federal Government to truly unlock consolidation and LDC modernization.
The future of Ontario's energy distribution system will be defined by the ability of its LDCs to attract capital, scale operations, and demonstrate impeccable governance. Municipal shareholders have reached the tipping point where inaction is the most expensive course of action.
Ultimately, the structure of Ontario's LDC sector can be guided and incentivized by regulatory and tax changes, yet any consolidation should and must be voluntary—a commercial decision for the municipal shareholders to make. While the small-is-beautiful argument may appeal to the principle of local control, market forces will ultimately (eventually) penalize or reward poor owner choices. The choice facing municipal shareholders now is clear: proactively manage the transition to a modern, consolidated, and well-capitalized utility, or risk watching market forces and mandatory regulatory action erode the value of their historic LDC assets and the competitiveness of their local economy.
CECI NE CONSTITUE PAS UN AVIS JURIDIQUE. L'information qui est présentée dans le site Web sous quelque forme que ce soit est fournie à titre informatif uniquement. Elle ne constitue pas un avis juridique et ne devrait pas être interprétée comme tel. Aucun utilisateur ne devrait prendre ou négliger de prendre des décisions en se fiant uniquement à ces renseignements, ni ignorer les conseils juridiques d'un professionnel ou tarder à consulter un professionnel sur la base de ce qu'il a lu dans ce site Web. Les professionnels de Gowling WLG seront heureux de discuter avec l'utilisateur des différentes options possibles concernant certaines questions juridiques précises.