Employment Essentials - Spring 2025 Employment Law Update

For Women Scotland Ltd v Scottish Ministers [2025] UKSC 16

The Supreme Court has held that the terms 'woman', 'man' and 'sex' in the Equality Act 2010 refer to a person's 'biological sex' (being the sex of a person at birth). Therefore, a person with a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC) in the female gender does not come within the definition of a 'woman' under the Equality Act 2010 (EqA).

Although the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (GRA) provides that a trans person with a GRC is entitled to have their acquired gender recognised 'for all purposes' this is subject to exceptions including 'provision made by…any other enactment or any subordinate legislation'. The Supreme Court concluded that the exception contained in the GRA applies where there is a clear incompatibility with other legislation making that other legislation's provisions incoherent or unworkable. It concluded that a 'certificated sex' interpretation of the EqA would:

• lead to incoherence, particularly in areas like pregnancy, maternity, and sex-based protections.
• unfairly divide the trans community (by giving those with a GRC greater rights) and create practical issues for service providers, who cannot lawfully ask if someone holds a GRC.
• erode protections for others, such as lesbian-only spaces and associations.
• interfere with the coherent function of the legal provision of separate spaces and single-sex services, communal accommodation, and medical care; and
• impede coherent and practicable function of provisions relating to single sex characteristic associations and charities, fair sport participation, the operation of the public sector equality duty and the armed forces.

The Court rejected the suggestion that 'woman' and 'sex' could refer to biological sex in some sections of the EqA and certificated sex in others. The meaning of these terms had to be consistent throughout the EqA.

As pointed out by the Supreme Court, this interpretation does not remove protection from trans people (with or without a gender recognition certificate). Trans people are protected from discrimination on the ground of gender reassignment and are also able to claim direct discrimination, indirect discrimination and harassment on the ground of perception or association with their acquired gender.

Comment

This case involves issues subject to intense and often heated debate in recent years over which individuals and organisations may hold firm views. It should be remembered that the Supreme Court has not been asked nor addressed the sociological question of 'who is a woman'. The issue the Court had to address did not relate to a fundamental sociological question or even a question of social policy. Instead, it is a question of statutory construction: How are 'women', 'men' and 'sex' defined for the purposes of the EqA 2010. The Court has answered with a clear 'biological sex' being the sex of a person at birth.

This judgment aims to provide a coherent and predictable meaning of the words 'woman', 'man', and 'sex' within the EqA 2010. The clear judgment of the Supreme Court should allow employers and service providers to apply the EqA 2010 with a confident understanding of these words.

However, while we have a clear meaning of "sex", "woman" and "man" for EqA purposes, there remains practical difficulties for some employers over shared toilets and changing facilities.

On 25 April, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) published an interim update on the practical consequences of the Supreme Court's decision. The EHRC states:

1. "trans women (biological men) should not be permitted to use the women's facilities and trans men (biological women) should not be permitted to use the men's facilities, as this will mean that they are no longer single-sex facilities and must be open to all users of the opposite sex
2. in some circumstances the law also allows trans women (biological men) not to be permitted to use the men's facilities, and trans men (biological woman) not to be permitted to use the women's facilities
3. however, where facilities are available to both men and women, trans people should not be put in a position where there are no facilities for them to use
   
   
4. where possible, mixed-sex toilet, washing or changing facilities in addition to sufficient single-sex facilities should be provided
   
   
5. where toilet, washing or changing facilities are in lockable rooms (not cubicles) which are intended for the use of one person at a time, they can be used by either women or men."

Point five of the interim guidance reflects the showering/toilet facilities provisions under The Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992 which require (among other things) that separate rooms containing conveniences must be provided for men and women, except where and so far as each convenience is in a separate room, the door of which is capable of being secured from inside [emphasis added].

Despite having described its interim update as a guide to the "practical implications" of judgment, the EHRC does not address many of the difficult issues that organisations are likely to face as a result, such as how to communicate and enforce revised policies on single-sex spaces while balancing and respecting the rights, safety and dignity of all those who are affected. It is worth noting that the interim update is non-statutory guidance and courts and tribunals will not be required to take it into account, although they may choose to consider it.

The EHRC is currently updating its Code of Practice on services, public functions and associations and accompanying guidance. A consultation on the revisions to this Code of Practice is expected to be published shortly and to 30 June. As employers are left to grapple with sensitive issues, the revised guidance for service providers may also prove useful for employers once it is available.

Morais v Ryanair DAC [2025] EWCA Civ 19

Protection under Blacklists Regulations extends to workers taking industrial action

This case concerns a group of airline pilots who participated in a strike called by BALPA. Because of their participation in the strike, Ryanair withdrew concessionary travel benefits from them for a year.

In a long-running battle, the Court of Appeal has now held that the Employment Relations Act 1999 (Blacklists) Regulations 2010 (which render it unlawful to compile or use a list of persons who have taken part in trade union activities with a view to discriminating against them) confer protection on those who have taken part in industrial action.

In the Court's view, the definition of "activities of trade unions" had to be given its natural meaning, which covers participation in a strike. Of particular note, the Court also held that the protection extends to all official industrial action (action that has been organised or endorsed by a trade union) regardless of whether the trade union itself benefits from immunity (for example loss of immunity due to non-compliance with balloting notice requirements).

Comment

This judgment confirms that employers cannot penalise striking employees by putting them on a "prohibited list" in order to discriminate against them. But it is important to note that the current position in relation to subjecting workers to a detriment (short of dismissal) for participating in industrial action under the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULR(C)A) differs.

Under TULR(C)A, protection from detriment short of dismissal only applies in relation to "taking part in trade union activities". As held by the Supreme Court last year in Secretary of State for Business and Trade v Mercer [2024] UKSC 12, "taking part in trade union activities" under TULR(C)A has a restricted meaning (due to the how that Act is drafted) and does not extend to protection from detriment short of dismissal for participating in lawful strike action. The Supreme Court did, however, go on to make a declaration that the current scope of protection under TULR(C)A is not compatible with the European Convention of Human Rights. As a result, it is now up to Parliament to rectify the law in this regard, which is being done under the provisions of the Employment Rights Bill (ERB).

For now, the meaning of 'detriment' for taking part in 'trade union activities' under the Blacklisting Regulations is much broader than the meaning under TULR(C)A. Furthermore, for the protection against detriment to apply under the Blacklisting Regulations there is no requirement that the industrial action must be "protected" industrial action under TULR(C)A. The industrial action must be "official", but only in the sense of being organised or endorsed by the union under its rules, there is no requirement for conformity with the balloting and notification requirements. Once strengthened under the ERB, this is also highly likely to be the case under TULR(C)A protection.

Ryanair is currently seeking permission to appeal to the Supreme Court

Campbell v Sheffield Teaching North Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust [2025] EAT 42

Employer took "all reasonable steps" to prevent black employee from being racially abused and in any event the incident did not occur "in the course of employment"

The Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) has upheld an employment tribunal decision that an NHS Trust was not liable for a racist comment by one of its employees.

In this case, C a Trust employee, was Branch Secretary of UNISON. H, another Trust employee, had sought to terminate his UNISON membership, but his subscriptions were still being deducted. He went to C's office during a break from work to ask for a refund. When C refused, the discussion became heated, and H made a racist comment.

The EAT noted that there were several connections between the incident and H's employment by the Trust: it took place during H's working day, in an office close to his working area, and it related to union membership that entitled him to the support of a union recognised by the Trust. However, H's membership of UNISON was a personal choice and the conversation related to a personal dispute with UNISON over union dues, accordingly H was not acting "in the course of employment" for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010.

In the alternative, the EAT also agreed with the tribunal that the Trust had taken all reasonable steps to prevent harassment for the purposes of section 109(4) of the Equality Act 2010 (principals' liability for acts of agents). The steps taken by the Trust were:

• An induction session for all employees on dignity at work at which the Trust's core ('PROUD') values were introduced.
  
  
• Annual performance assessments which included consideration of compliance with PROUD values.

• Display of PROUD posters in the workplace.
  
  
• The conducting of mandatory equality and diversity training every 3 years (recently completed by H a few weeks before the incident).

Since no further steps which had not been taken had been suggested by the evidence, it was reasonable to conclude that these comprised "all reasonable steps" in this case.

Comment

Under section 109 of the Equality Act 2010 an employer can establish a statutory defence in a claim involving harassment by a colleague where the employer can establish it took "all reasonable steps" to prevent the harassment occurring. This can be a high hurdle. This case provides a useful example of a successful "all reasonable steps" defence.

There is little case law on the s109 "all reasonable steps" defence as this statutory defence is relatively little used. However, since the duty to prevent sexual harassment was introduced in October 2024 this may change. Currently, the duty to prevent sexual harassment only requires employers to have taken "reasonable steps", a lower threshold. However, under the Employment Rights Bill this is expected to be amended to require employers to take "all reasonable steps" to prevent sexual harassment. Employers should take note of this judgment.

It also provides a helpful illustrates on the separation of acting "in the course of employment" and acting in relation to union activity only.

Higgs v Farmor's School [2025] EWCA Civ 109

Christian employee's dismissal for gender critical Facebook posts was direct discrimination

The Court of Appeal has provided new guidance on how discrimination law applies to protected beliefs. While the employee won her claim on the facts, the Court has confirmed that direct belief discrimination can be justified in some cases.

In this case the Court considered the dismissal of an employee for reposting gender critical views on social media, finding that the employee's dismissal was disproportionate in the circumstances and amounted to direct religion or belief discrimination. The Court held that it would be unlawful direct discrimination for an employer to discipline or dismiss an employee merely because they have expressed a religious or protected philosophical belief in a way which the employer, or a third party with whom it wishes to protect its reputation, objects. In particular:

• An employee's statement should be judged "by what they actually say (albeit including any necessary implications) rather than by what some readers might choose illegitimately to read into [their words]."
• Employers must guard against making stereotypical assumptions about the extent of the employee's beliefs, not equating gender-critical beliefs with transphobia, to use the EHRC's example.
• There is no universal rule that an employee's lack of insight into the consequences of their actions may justify an employer in choosing dismissal rather than a less severe sanction.

However, as ever, each case will turn on its own facts. Sometimes an employer's decision to discipline or dismiss the employee is motivated not simply by the expression of the protected belief itself (or a third parties' reaction to it), but rather by something that is objectionable about the particular way in which it the employee expressed their protected belief (assessed objectively).

Where it is possible to separate the employee's "objectionable manifestation" of their protected belief from the mere expression of it in this way, then it will only be lawful for an employer to discipline or dismiss the employee if that sanction is objectively justified. This requires the employer to prove that the disciplinary action/dismissal was a proportionate response to the objectionable way in which the employee has expressed their protected belief.

Comment

Handling conflicts of belief in the workplace remains a difficult area for employers to navigate and the law is complex. Many employers will have experience of receiving a grievance from a staff member complaining about a colleague's social media posts. However, the Court stressed that there is no right not to be offended and that "freedom of speech necessarily entails the freedom to express opinions that may shock and offend".

Employers face a significant ongoing challenge to balance the rights of all individuals in the workplace. Employers have to find a way to manage the rights of employees who may hold protected beliefs that conflict with the beliefs of others within the workplace and protect their own business interests. Each case will be fact sensitive, and advice sought.

Farmor's School is currently seeking permission to appeal to the Supreme Court. One to watch!

Marston (Holdings) Ltd v Perkins [2025] EAT 20

Indirect discrimination: tribunal erred in application of childcare disparity

The concept of "judicial notice" allows a tribunal to accept widely recognised facts without requiring specific evidence. The "childcare disparity" is a recognition that more women than men carry the majority of childcare responsibilities. The need to take judicial notice of the childcare disparity arises because, in some situations, the link between the protected characteristic and the particular disadvantage might be obvious. The tribunal's task is to consider the particular nature of the provision, criterion or practice (PCP) in issue to determine whether that clearly would give rise to difficulties for women, such as would amount to a group disadvantage.

Back in 2021, the EAT observed in Dobson v North Cumbria Integrated Care NHS Foundation UKEAT/0220/19, that taking judicial notice of the disparity does not necessarily mean that group disadvantage is made out. Whether it is will depend on the interrelationship between the general position that is the result of the childcare disparity and the particular PCP in question.

In Marston the EAT makes clear that although tribunals can take judicial notice of the childcare disparity, it does not necessarily mean that group disadvantage is automatically proved without a proper assessment of the impact of the PCP. For example, night work is more likely to put women as a group at a disadvantage, because of the absence of night-time childcare, than a requirement to attend the office one day a month with advanced notice as in this case.

Comment

Generally, employers should ensure new workplace policies are carefully considered. Thought should be given to how such policies may impact both groups and individuals in the workplace. An employer must be able to evidence clear justification for such policies to mitigate the risk of any claims.

Ghebrehiwt v Wilson James Ltd [2005] EAT 59

Time off is to deal with "immediate crisis" not extended time off to provide personal care

Under section 57A of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (time off for dependents), employees are entitled to reasonable unpaid time off work to deal with an emergency involving a dependant, for example, if a dependant falls ill or is injured, if care arrangements break down, or to arrange or attend a dependant's funeral.

In this case, an employee was absent without leave for 5 weeks during the early part of the Covid-19 pandemic. He stated he was absent to care for his vulnerable mother and refused to return to work. He claimed he was entitled to be absent under s57A.

The EAT upheld a finding that s57A leave did not entitle the employee to take a lengthy period of absence in order to care for his mother himself. While he had a right to take some time to make arrangements for the care of his mother, s57A did not give him the right to take time off work to provide care for her himself for a lengthy period of time.

Comment

As held back in 2003 in Qua v John Morrison Solicitors the right to time off to care for a dependant does not give employees the right to take time off to provide personal care for a sick dependant, "beyond the reasonable amount necessary to enable them to deal with the immediate crisis". How long that period may be will depend upon the circumstances of the individual case.

Brake Bros Ltd v Hudek [2025] EAT 53

Contractual requirement for flexibility did not entitle employee to additional pay

The EAT has overturned an employment tribunal's decision that a lorry driver was entitled to be paid for additional hours worked above the intended weekly average specified in his contract. While his normal working hours were 47 hours per week over five shifts, this was subject to a requirement to work such hours as were necessary for the proper performance of his duties on each shift. When a review found several delivery routes resulted in shifts exceeding nine hours, a contract addendum recorded a salary increase representing an additional two hours per week. This enabled routes to be planned to a 47-hour week. Overtime was paid for any additional full shift or half shift (at least 4.5 hours) worked. If a normal shift took longer than expected but did not involve at least 4.5 hours no additional payment was made.

A lorry driver brought a claim for unlawful deduction from wages claim arguing he should receive pro rata payments, based on his annual salary, for any additional hours he had worked. The EAT agreed with the employer and dismissed the claim. The contractual provision for flexibility did not give rise to an entitlement to additional pay. The contract provided basic pay for working five shifts of variable length each week. Neither business efficacy nor the unexpressed intention of the parties justified the implication of a term that provided pay for hours worked beyond intended normal working hours other than when the express overtime provisions were engaged.

Comment

This judgment is particularly relevant for industries where variability in hours is inherent in the role, such as the haulage industry. It highlights the importance of express terms within employment contracts to avoid overtime disputes.

Sullivan v Isle of Wight Council [2025] EWCA Civ 379

The Court of Appeal has confirmed that whistleblowing protection only extends to either workers or applicants for a post with an NHS employer (due to specific provisions). Generally, external job applicants do not have protection.

The Court held that the exclusion of job applicants (other than those applying for jobs in the NHS) from the whistleblowing detriment provisions in the ERA is compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR as an external job applicant is not in a materially analogous position to a worker.

In any event, the job applicant in this case did not suffer the alleged less favourable treatment in her capacity as an external job applicant. The alleged protected disclosure (about the financial affairs of a charity connected to one of the individuals sitting on the interview panel) did not relate to the application process.

Comment

Reminder that outside of the NHS, job applicants are not protected under the whistleblowing provisions as they are not in a position akin to an occupational status.

Easton v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Border Force) [2025] EAT 15

Deliberately withholding information in a job application form may be found to be dishonest and justify a fair dismissal.

The EAT has upheld a dismissal for gross misconduct arising from omission in a job application. This case concerned a career civil servant working as a Chief Immigration Officer. When E applied for the position the application form included a box for him to set out his employment history. He provided his employment history using years only, thereby concealing a three-month gap following his dismissal for gross misconduct, which he also did not mention at any stage during the recruitment process. After he started work, the Home Office discovered his previous dismissal. A disciplinary investigation was launched, concluding E had been dishonest in his job application by omitting relevant information. He was therefore dismissed for gross misconduct.

The EAT concluded that the dismissal was within the range of reasonable responses available to the employer given that it had a genuine belief in E's dishonesty, which was reasonably held given the investigation which the employer had carried out. The EAT reasoned that there was nothing ambiguous about being asked to provide employment history. E's argument that the application form should have spelt out that precise dates of employment were required so any gaps in employment could be understood was unrealistic. A reasonable applicant would understand that an "Employment History" section required a full and transparent account, including providing information about any employment gaps.

Comment

As confirmed by the EAT, the standard by which responses to questions in an employment application process fall to be judged is an objective one and reflects the duty to take reasonable care to ensure that statements of fact, which are likely to be relied upon, are accurate.

Due to other aspects of this case, E did not need to establish two-years' service in this role to bring his unfair dismissal claim. While many potential claimants in a similar scenario will not get over the current two-year service requirement, this will be changing under the Employment Rights Bill (ERB). When in force unfair dismissal will become a da one right.

This case and the upcoming changes under the ERB also highlight the importance of checking employment history and references on job applications before the commencement of employment. A more extreme example can be found in a 2018 employment tribunal case of Mr Francis-McGann v West Atlantic UK Ltd (a case over notice pay - the employer succeeded in establishing it was entitled to dismiss without notice pay).

Inspired by a tale from a galaxy far, far away, Mr Francis-McGann, a pilot, applied for a captain position with a freight airline. He falsely claimed to have previously worked as a captain when his previous positions had all been as a first officer. He gave as a referee Capt Desilijic Tiure. The pilot was appointed as a captain before his references were checked.

The person who initially decided to hire Mr Francis-McGann was clearly not an obsessive Star Wars fan. When his references were checked, it became obvious that Capt Desilijic Tiure was not real, being Jabba Desilijic Tiure, better known as Jabba the Hutt of Star Wars fame!

The Employment Rights Bill (ERB) introduced in Parliament on 10 October 2024 completed the House of Commons Stage in March and is now before the House of Lords. Detailed scrutinization of the Bill by a Committee of the Lords began on 29 April 2025.

When first introduced in Parliament, the Bill was 158 pages long. Following numerous amendments at the House of Commons stage the Bill has approximately doubled in size to 310 pages! And more amendments are likely once the House of Lords stage is completed. Indeed, on 29 April the Government put forward 27 more amendments at the first sitting of the House of Lords Committee stage.

The ERB contains a number of highly significant reforms to employment law. These sweeping changes are set to reshape the employment law landscape. The areas covered by the ERB include:

• Zero hours/low hours contracts - introducing a right to reasonable notice of shifts (and cancellation) and to be offered a guaranteed hours contracts (GHC), reflecting hours regularly worked. Following amendment, this will now also include agency workers with the end user needing to offer qualifying agency workers GHCs fundamentally changing the employment relationship in those cases.
• Unfair dismissal - removing the two-year qualifying period (so employees are protected from unfair dismissal from the first day of employment), subject to an "initial period of employment" period, during which a "modified dismissal procedure" test will apply. We await crucial detail in this regard.
• Fire and rehire - making it automatically unfair to dismiss workers because they refuse to agree to a variation of contract. This is a very significant change. Unless an employer is in "financial difficulties", if an employee refuses to agree to any variation of their contract for any reason and is dismissed as a result, it will be an automatically unfair dismissal even where the employer has a genuine "technical or organisational" or "health & safety" reason for the variation.
• Collective redundancy - making changes to the collective consultation triggers and doubling financial awards for non-compliance from 90 to 180 days' pay per employee. A notable amendment to the Bill means the 'at one establishment' factor has been retained, though a modified threshold will apply in some cases (detail awaited).
• Flexible working - requiring employers to justify the refusal of flexible working requests.
• Statutory sick pay - removing the three-day waiting period (so employees are eligible from the first day of illness or injury) and the lower earnings limit (LEL) test for eligibility. Those earning under the LEL to instead receive 80% of SSP.
• Family leave - removing the qualifying period for paternity leave and ordinary parental leave (so employees have the right from the first day of employment) and expanding eligibility for bereavement leave.
• Protection from harassment - expanding employers' duties to prevent harassment of staff, note there are currently rumblings of opposition currently in the House of Lords.
• Equalities - introduce a requirement to publish equality action plans alongside gender pay gap reports.
• Trade unions - including introducing rights for trade unions to access workplaces and electronic balloting, repealing the Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Act 2023 and most provisions of the Trade Union Act 2016 (lowering of thresholds for union recognition and strike ballots etc…).
• Employment Tribunals - extending the time period for bringing the vast majority of employment tribunal claims from three to six months.
• State enforcement - bringing together powers of existing labour market enforcement bodies into one Fair Work Agency (FWA), along with significant new enforcement powers for the FWA.

Comment

The significance of the ERB should not be underestimated. The Bill itself is hoped to be passed before the summer recess. However, much of the detail on many of the policies in the Bill will be provided through implementing regulations which will require further consultation. As for coming into force, a small number of the changes relating to trade union law reform, are to come into force two months after the Bill is passed. However, the majority of the changes will not be brought into force before 2026 with the changes to unfair dismissal qualifying periods not before autumn 2026. With the amount of outstanding detail, 2026 may prove a challenge.

One area that had previously been expected to be included in the ERB but has now been shelved altogether, is the introduction of a legal right to "switch off" outside working hours.

For more on the provisions of the ERB and the latest amendments, see our tracker Employment Essentials: Employment law changes 2025 and beyond

Ethnicity and Disability Pay Gap Reporting

On 18 March 2025, the Government commenced a consultation 'Equality (Race and Disability) Bill: mandatory ethnicity and disability pay gap reporting'. The consultation seeks views on how to implement mandatory ethnicity and disability pay gap reporting for large employers in Great Britain (employers with 250 or more employees). The consultation runs until 10 June 2025.

The Government proposes to:

• require employers to use a similar reporting framework for ethnicity and disability as is already in place for gender pay gap reporting - reporting the same set of pay gap measures, using the same reporting dates and doing so online;
• make it mandatory for employers to report on the overall breakdown of their workforce by ethnicity and disability and the percentage of employees who do not disclose their personal data on their ethnicity and disability; and
• seek views on whether employers should be required to produce action plans for ethnicity and disability pay gap reporting.

The Government proposes using standardised ethnicity groupings. Given data protection considerations, it proposes a minimum of ten employees in any ethnic group be analysed. Smaller groups will need to be aggregated. As a minimum, employers will be required to report a binary comparison, preferably between White British employees and all other ethnic minority groups combined.

Similarly, with disability reporting, a minimum of ten employees must fall in each group being compared. To avoid the risk of individual identification and the complexities of multiple impairments, the Government proposes that disability reporting should take a binary approach of only reporting differences between disabled and non-disabled employees, rather than by type of impairment.

Comment

Finding a methodology resulting in meaningful data is no easy task. The approach set out in the Consultation attempts to address difficulties that arise due to small statistical group issues and issues around classification of those of differing ethnicities/disabilities. But does this leave any meaningful data? How comparisons for identifying pay gaps across a wide range of race-based identities and very different forms of disability will be made in practice will be challenging.

Equality law Call for Evidence

On 7 April 2025, the Office for Equality and Opportunity published 'Equality Law Call for Evidence' seeking evidence and views on areas of equality law, including the existing legal framework and possible reform. The responses will help shape the measures to be included in the draft Equality (Race and Disability) Bill. Responses are due by 30 June 2025.

Views are sought on:

• Equal pay
  • The prevalence of pay discrimination on the basis of race and disability;
  • whether the existing equal pay scheme provides the right model for an expanded set of equal pay rights;
  • measures to ensure employers cannot "outsource" services to avoid paying equal pay; and
  • improving enforcement by establishing an Equal Pay Regulatory and Enforcement Unit.
• Pay transparency
  • Measures to improve pay transparency; and
  • effectiveness of equal pay audits.

• Combined discrimination
  • Plans to bring into force s14 of the Equality Act 2010 (EA 2010) to prohibit direct discrimination because of a combination of two protected characteristics.

• Harassment protections
  • Plans to enact a power to specify steps that employers must take to prevent sexual harassment, as well as to specify matters to which employers must have regard when taking steps; and
  • whether to extend protections to volunteers.
• Public sector equality duty
  • The extent to which non-public bodies are complying with the public sector equality duty when exercising public functions.

• Socio-economic duty
  • How to commence the socio-economic duty requiring public authorities to give "due regard', when making strategic decisions.

Preventing sexual harassment guidance

Alongside their updated technical guidance on sexual harassment and 8-step guide for employers, in November, the Equality and Human Rights Commission published a checklist and action plan to help employers with compliance with the new positive duty to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace.

Modern slavery

On 24 March 2025, the Home Office published updated statutory guidance on transparency in supply chains to assist commercial organisations in preparing annual modern slavery statements under s 54 Modern Slavery Act 2015. The updated guidance explains what the Government expects from modern slavery statements and provides practical advice to support businesses in undertaking meaningful action to tackle modern slavery, incorporating learnings from the past ten years.

Data Protection

Keeping employment records

On 5 February 2025, the ICO published the long awaited finalised guidance for employers on keeping employment records covering (1) collecting and keeping employment records and (2) using employment records.

The updated guidance covers in detail most of the main aspects of employment records management and the links between data protection laws, including how employers can lawfully process workers' personal information, workers' rights to access their employment records and responsibility for data protection and record keeping in an organisation.

It provides guidance on the circumstances in which workers' personal information can be shared with other people or organisations, including what employers need to consider when providing references. The guidance also helps to clarify the circumstances in which an employer may, during their due diligence process, share additional information beyond what is required by the TUPE Regulations, for example during the preliminary stages of a proposed business transfer.

Anonymisation of records

On 28 March, the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) published guidance on anonymisation and pseudonymisation. The guidance provides an overview of anonymisation techniques, including their suitability of use in particular situations. The main benefits of anonymisation include protecting people's identities, greater security and improved risk reduction relating to the disclosure or publication of personal data.

The guidance also covers pseudonymisation. This might include replacing names or identifiers with resource numbers. The ICO reminds organisations that pseudonymisation should not be confused with anonymisation and that pseudonymisation does not change the status of the data as 'personal data' when processed in this way.

Although the guidance is not statutory and there is no penalty for not following the recommendations, the ICO will take it into account when looking into an issue about anonymisation.

Neonatal Care Leave & Pay

The new statutory entitlement to neonatal care leave and pay introduced by the Neonatal Care (Leave and Pay) Act 2023 came into force on 6 April 2025.

Neonatal Care Leave (NCL) will apply as follows:

• Day one right for employed parents of children born on or after 6 April 2025.
• The neonatal care must begin within 28 days of the child's birth and last for a continuous period of at least seven days (not including the day on which care starts).
• Eligible parents are entitled to take up to 12 weeks of leave on top of any other leave they may be entitled to, including maternity and paternity leave.A parent will be entitled to one week's leave for every week their child spends in neonatal care capped at a maximum of twelve weeks. The parent can take the leave when their child is still receiving neonatal care or after any other parental leave (for example maternity leave) that the parent may be eligible for, to allow time to bond with the child after leaving neonatal care.

• The regulations set out notice requirements, which the employer can agree to waive.

Statutory Neonatal Care Pay (SNCP):

• Eligible employed parents will receive a payment of £187.18 per week or 90% of average earnings (whichever is the lower)
• Available to those who meet continuity of service requirements (26 weeks) and a minimum earnings threshold (£125 per week).
• Employers to be reimbursed up to 92% through deductions from income tax, NICs and other payments.
• Employers will be required to maintain records for HMRC inspection for 3 years from the end of the tax year to which they relate.

On 7 April, the Government published a suite of new guidance for employees and employers:

1. Neonatal Care Pay and Leave - A guide for employees explaining entitlement, eligibility, how to claim, employment rights and how to cancel NCL or SNCP.
2. Statutory Neonatal Care Pay and Leave: employer guide - A guide for employers explaining entitlement, eligibility, employer record-keeping requirements, the financial assistance available to employers to pay SNCP, and the information an employee must provide, their employment rights and how they can cancel NCL or SNCP.
3. Business changes that affect payment of Statutory Neonatal Care Pay - A guide for employers who take over a business, stop trading, become insolvent or make an employee redundant.
4. How different employment types affect Statutory Neonatal Care Pay - A guide explaining the different SNCP rules that apply to different types of employees and workers, including agency workers, directors and employees with more than one job with the same employer, or with more than one employer.
5. Employee circumstances that affect payment of Statutory Neonatal Care Pay - A guide explaining how different employee circumstances may affect their entitlement to SNCP.
6. Manually calculate Statutory Neonatal Care Pay - A guide explaining how to manually calculate an employee's SNCP entitlement.
7. Tell an employee that they're not eligible for Statutory Neonatal Care Pay (NEO1) - A form for employers to use to advise an employee that they are not entitled to SNCP.

National Minimum Wage

From 1 April 2025, the rates of the national minimum wage (NMW) will be as follows:

• National Living Wage (NLW) (21 and over): £12.21 (previously £11.44).
• 18-20 year old rate: £10.00 (previously £8.60).
• 16-17 year old rate: £7.55 (previously £6.40).
• Apprentice rate: £7.55 (previously £6.40).
• Accommodation offset: £10.66 (previously £9.99).

This is a slower transition to a single adult rate (for those aged 18-plus) than originally expected. This continues the existing move towards a single adult rate NMW (in April 2024 the age band for the NLW lowered to 21 - previously 23 having already reduced from 25 in April 2021).

Tribunal award limits

From 6 April 2025, the tribunal award limits increased:

• a week's pay - £719 (previously £700).
• maximum basic award/statutory redundancy payment - £21,570 (previously £21,000).
• maximum compensatory award - the lower of £118,223 (previously £115,115) or 52 weeks' pay.

Note: The new rates apply where the "appropriate date" occurs on or after 6 April 2025 (for example, for unfair dismissal the effective date of termination) not the date of the corresponding tribunal hearing.

Statutory Payments

From 6 April 2025

• the standard rate of statutory sick pay increased to £118.75 per week (previously £116.75).
• The standard rates of statutory maternity, paternity, adoption, shared parental leave and parental bereavement pay increased to £187.18 per week (previously £184.03).